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Abstract
The problem of arriving at a principled method of pricing goods and services was very satisfac-
torily solved for conventional goods; however, this solution is not applicable to digital goods. This
paper studies pricing of a special class of digital goods, which we call semantically substitutable
digital goods. After taking into consideration idiosyncrasies of goods in this class, we define a
market model for it, together with a notion of equilibrium. We prove existence of equilibrium
prices for our market model using Kakutani’s fixed point theorem.
The far reaching significance of a competitive equilibrium is made explicit in the Fundamental
Theorems of Welfare Economics. There are basic reasons due to which these theorems are not
applicable to digital goods. This naturally leads to the question of whether the allocations of
conventional goods are rendered inefficient or “socially unfair” in the mixed economy we have
proposed. We prove that that is not the case and that in this sense, the intended goal of Welfare
Economics is still achieved in the mixed economy.
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1 Introduction
The central problem of mathematical economics – arriving at a principled method of pricing goods
and services which leads to an efficient allocation of scarce resources among alternative uses – was
very satisfactorily solved for conventional goods. The solution was based on Adam Smith’s principle
of maintaining parity between supply and demand [Smi86], Walras’ notion of equilibrium [Wal74],
and the Arrow-Debreu Theorem, which proved the existence of equilibrium in a very general model
of the economy [AD54].
By a digital good we mean a good that can be stored on a digital computer. For such goods, which
already occupy a large fraction of the economy and are expected to only grow in the future, this
solution is not applicable – once produced, a digital good can be reproduced at (essentially) zero cost,
thus making its supply infinite. Several economists have addressed this dilemma and have proposed
ways of pricing digital goods e.g., see [BK00, BB99, Qua03, Var96]. However, to our knowledge,
none of them has given a reasonable market model that leads to pricing such goods from a notion of
equilibrium that balances supply and demand, i.e., as was achieved for conventional goods.
In this paper, we propose such a market model for the special class of digital goods defined in the next
section. We start by observing that traditional market models are not applicable for pricing digital
goods. The reason is that an allocation made at a competitive equilibrium in such a model satisfies
the first welfare theorem and is therefore Pareto optimal. On the other hand, since the supply of
digital goods is unbounded, any Pareto optimal allocation must give one copy of each digital good
to each agent. Clearly, such an allocation is not particularly meaningful for our purposes.
Throughout this paper, we will assume that copyright laws are strictly enforced. Hence, only the
agent who owns/produces a certain digital good is allowed to sell copies of it; an agent who buys this
good is not allowed to sell copies of it, i.e., the owner of this good has a monopoly on its sale. At first
sight it would appear that pricing of digital goods should follow from monopolistic considerations.
Yet, we identify a class of digital goods below for which monopolistic pricing should not apply. We
then give a method of expressing preferences that is more appropriate than the traditional method
for this class of goods – it involves expressing preferences by combining a cardinal component with
an ordinal component. This and other considerations lead to the natural assumption of uniform
pricing, which in turn yields a simple market model for which we can define notions of “supply” and
“demand,” and a notion of equilibrium prices.
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of this work is that the property of unlimited supply turns out
to be an advantage rather than an impediment to finding equilibrium pricing of digital goods – the
pricing structure we obtain is in fact simpler than the traditional one. However, it is not applicable to
conventional goods, except in some very special circumstances as mentioned below. In retrospect, the
two main ideas that led to this model are our method of expressing preferences and the assumption
of uniform pricing – one can see that these two ideas fit with each other very well.
The generality of the Arrow-Debreu theorem is quite remarkable: for any market model for which one
can define a preference order over all bundles of goods, one can establish existence of equilibrium as
a corollary of this theorem. In Section 3 we show that such a preference order cannot be defined for
our market model and hence we need to prove the existence of equilibrium for it from first principles.
A key question remaining is whether the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics [Arr51, Deb59]
are satisfied by this mixed economy, consisting of conventional and digital goods. Traditional market
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models satisfy the First Welfare Theorem, which states that allocations made via a competitive
equilibrium are efficient. As stated above, the availability of infinite number of copies of each digital
good renders the usual notion of efficiency inapplicable to our model. Inefficiency would be an even
more acute issue if the allocation of conventional goods, which are presumably more important for
survival, is also rendered inefficient by the mixed economy. Hence, one may ask if a competitive
equilibrium in this mixed economy ensures efficiency as far as conventional goods are concerned.
Our answer to this question is “Yes”. In Section 6, we give the notion of partial Pareto optimality,
which is essentially Pareto optimality assuming that the digital part of the economy, i.e., production
and allocation of digital goods, is fixed. As our First Welfare Theorem, we prove that equilibrium
allocations in our mixed economy are partially Pareto optimal.
The traditional Second Welfare Theorem has profound implications. It says that the issues of eco-
nomic efficiency and equity can be effectively separated out; the distributive objectives of the state
can be met via initial lump sum taxes and incentives followed by letting the market attain its own
equilibrium. Once again, in our mixed economy, this theorem is not applicable as such. Fortunately,
such a theorem is not essential for ensuring social equity – after all, our digital economy consists of
goods primarily from the entertainment industry which are (presumably) not as essential for people’s
survival.
In our Second Welfare Theorem, the target distributive objectives are provided by a restriction of
the mixed economy to only conventional goods. We show how any target set in this manner leads
to a prescription of lump sum transfers. Once they are made and the mixed economy is allowed to
attain its equilibrium, we guarantee that each agent will be at least as happy with their allocation
as was desired; of course, optimal bundles now consist of conventional and digital goods. The choice
of ‘what is optimal’ is left to individual agents – if someone requires lots of inspiration and only
a little bit of food for survival then that is what they will get. We note that whereas the Second
Welfare Theorem is usually proved using the hyperplane separation theorem, we seem to require the
full power of Kakutani’s fixed point thoerem.
2 Semantically Substitutable Digital Goods
In this paper, we will study pricing of digital goods that can be partitioned into a few categories
through semantic considerations such that there is a high degree of substitutability of goods within
a category. However, if all the goods in the category were equally accessible, agents would want
to optimize all the way and get their most favorite goods. The entertainment industry is replete
with such digital goods, e.g., music, movies and video games (barring exceptional cases). Examples
of semantic categories for music may be contemporary classical music, premier jazz, second tier
jazz, children’s songs, etc. We will call this class of goods semantically substitutable digital goods.
Henceforth, a unit of good in a digital category will be generically called a song. The assumption of
high degree of substitutability ensures that owners of songs cannot exercise monopolistic pricing for
the sale of their songs.
Examples of digital goods that do not fall into this class include software, online news and news
papers, financial advice and audio books. Finally observe that even ideas can be viewed as digital
goods, since they can be stored on a digital computer and sold to an unbounded number of times;
however, they do not fall in our class.
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A common feature of semantically substitutable digital goods – and in fact many other types of
digital goods – which sets them apart from conventional goods, is the staggering number of different
goods, belonging to the same genre, that are available with equal ease – and typically great ease,
i.e., simply downloading from the Internet. For example, iTunes currently has 11 million songs, the
Netflix on-demand Internet streaming video store has over 100,000 movies and the iPhone apps store
has 350,000 apps for sale. Henceforth we will assume each category in our class contains a large
number of songs.
Because of this fact, viewing all the songs as individual goods and providing a traditional utility
may not be feasible for the agents. Therefore, we first give a method of expressing preferences that
is more appropriate for this class of goods. It has two components, a cardinal component that
helps determine how many songs the agent should get from each category and an ordinal component
which helps determine which particular songs she should get from each category. For the cardinal
component each agent picks a concave function, and hence this part satisfies decreasing marginal
utility, as usual. For the ordinal component, each agent provides, for each digital category, a total
order on all songs in it. This helps avoid the cumbersome (and perhaps even meaningless) task of
making fine quantitative distinctions between the large number of songs in each category. In the
past these two components have been used separately, the best examples being traditional utility
functions and the stable marriage problem, respectively. However, to our knowledge they have not
been used together.
We now give an illustrative example. Suppose an agent needs some songs every month from each
of the following categories: jazz, pop music, children’s music, and recently released movies. Each
one has a different purpose: providing relaxation, listening while driving from home to work and
back, liked by the children, and entertainment during weekends. Clearly, she can make quantitative
statements about the relative importance of each category. However, within a category, she obviously
prefers to get her most favorite songs. Fortunately, unlimited supply of digital goods makes the latter
possible.
This method of expressing preferences leads naturally to the assumption given below on pricing
goods in a category. First, we note that pricing all goods in a category individually would be an
enormous burden on the seller. More importantly, it would be an even bigger burden on the buyer
(imagine deciding between song A for $1.23, song B for $1.42, ...), and would discourage people from
participating in such a market1.
Assumption of uniform pricing: For the class of semantically substitutable digital goods, in each
category, all songs will have the same price.
A few categories with uniform pricing within each category has already emerged as the norm over
the last few decades in several multi-billion dollar marketplaces associated with digital goods: First
for goods that were the forerunners of semantically substitutable digital goods digital, e.g., CDs for
music and video cassettes and DVDs for movies. Uniformity became even more strict when these
goods started being sold as bona fide digital goods, e.g., iTunes started off by uniformly pricing all
songs, but recently partitioned their 11 million songs into 3 price categories. For renting movies,
iTunes has only 2 different price categories. Similar practices apply to video games, and in fact to
other classes of digital goods as well, e.g., iPhone/Android apps. In contrast, uniform pricing within
1Indeed, this is the quintessential scenario where the usual game-theoretic assumptions of individual rationality and
infinite computing power (together with infinite patience) fail completely.
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a few categories has not emerged as the norm for the pricing of audio books, which are digital goods.
Interestingly, this was the case for the forerunners of these goods as well, i.e. for normal books.
We note that the simplicity of pricing made possible by the assumption of uniform pricing has led
to their use in some special non-digital markets as well, e.g., for a large number of drugs, Walmart
charges $4 for a 30-day dose and $10 for a 90-day dose. A second category, containing much fewer
drugs go for $9 for a 30-day dose and $24 for a 90-day dose [Wal11]. As another example, consider
the pricing of Chinese dim sum – the amount charged from a table depends on the number of small
plates, large plates and baskets of food consumed. These 3 categories contain different sets of food
items.
In order to achieve a simplified pricing structure, can the ideas stated above be used for conventional
goods after partitioning them into a few categories, e.g., vegetables, fruits, breads and beverages?
Can one enforce uniform prices in the categories? Since these questions will reveal important aspects
of our market model, let us explore them in some depth. Let us assume that the agents provide
cardinal utilities across categories and ordinal utilities within categories. For the latter, for each
category, say fruits, the agent provides an infinite sequence of fruits, with repetitions. If at given
prices, the agent is to receive k fruits, then she should be allocated the first k fruits in her sequence.
Clearly, such a market is bound for failure, since the demand for individual fruits will typically not
be compatible with supply – certain fruits will be deficient while others will be in excess. In the
absence of the capability of lowering the price of the latter, they will simply rot.
On the other hand digital goods will never be deficient because they can be replicated indefinitely.
Moreover, digital goods are not perishable and their storage does not require huge warehouses.
Thus, in a sense the digital economy appears to be tailor made for the simplified way of expressing
preferences and the simplified pricing structure presented above.
2.1 Some idiosyncrasies of “songs”
Having settled on uniform pricing of all songs within a category, we are still left with the questions
of defining the notion of an optimal bundle of goods for an agent and of pricing individual categories
from first principles, i.e., from a notion of equilibrium that is appropriate for our setting. In this
section, we point out some idiosyncrasies of the digital class we have identified which will lead
naturally to the formal model defined in the next section and a notion of equilibrium for it.
First, as already pointed out above, once produced, the supply of a song is unbounded. Second,
an agent desiring 2 songs wants 2 different songs; 2 copies of the same song are no better than 1
copy. Third, although all songs in a category are uniformly priced, they are not equally desired by
an agent. In fact, the typical case is that there is a wide variation in how an agent rates the different
songs of a category. Furthermore, the ratings of different agents for songs within the same category
also vary widely. To capture the last aspect, we need to make a radical change from traditional
market models as detailed in the next section.
3 The Market Model
The digital economy we describe can be added to, and will harmoniously co-exist with, a conventional
Arrow-Debreu economy. In interest of highlighting the main new ideas, we have kept the latter
4
economy simple by assuming that it has only one good which we will call bread. Another simplification
made is that the initial endowment of an agent will only consist of songs.
Our model has a set A of n agents numbered 1 to n and some genres of semantically substitutable
digital goods, e.g. music and movies. We will assume that this set of digital goods have been
partitioned into g semantic categories, numbered 1 to g. We will assume that bread is numbered as
good 0. Let G = {0, 1, 2, . . . , g} represent the set of all digital categories and bread. We will assume
that all the goods, conventional and digital, are divisible2. We will index agents by i and elements
of G by j.
Assume that the price per unit of bread is denoted by p0 and the price per song in category j is
denoted by pj. Let p = (p0, p1, . . . , pg) denote the entire price vector. We will assume that each
digital category j starts off with a non-empty set Sj , which in a sense “defines” this category. Each
song in Sj is owned by a unique agent; let Sij denote the songs of this category owned by i. Observe
that this also defines the initial endowments of agents since they consist only of songs. The earnings
from the sales of a song in Sj go to the specified owner.
For each agent, the set of feasible production points is a compact, convex set in Rg+1+ . We will
assume that the rate of production of bread by an agent is never zero. Moreover, we will assume
that the only factor limiting its production is labor, i.e., there is an indefinite supply of raw materials.
We will denote the entire production by y. Set yij will denote the songs in category j produced by
agent i; yij may contain a fractional song. The entire production of i will be denoted by yi. The
earnings of i will be
∑k
j=0 pj · zij, where zi0 = yi0 is the number of units of bread produced by i and
for 1 ≤ j ≤ g, zij is the number of copies of songs in Sij ∪ yij that were sold (taking fractions into
consideration). Observe that each agent will have positive earnings since she has the fall-back option
of producing bread.
At prices p, agent i’s optimal bundle of goods is obtained via a 2 step process. Let us introduce
some definitions before giving this process. Function fi : R
g+1
+ → R+ denotes the coarse utility
function of agent i; fi is assumed to be quasi-concave, continuous and satisfying non-satiation. A
coarse allocation for agent i is a vector zi = (zi0, . . . , zig) specifying the number of units of bread and
the number of songs from each category that get allocated to agent i. Her utility from this allocation
is fi(zi). For each digital category j, each agent i has a total order over the set (Sj ∪ A); we will
denoted this total order by Tij. Informally, this total order specifies the rating of i, over all agents
in A as producers of the songs in category j, as well as the songs already present in Sj .
At prices p, agent i’s optimal bundle of goods is determined as follows. First, let zi = (zi0, . . . , zig) be
the coarse allocation that maximizes fi(zi) w.r.t. prices p, taking into consideration the amount of
money agent i has available. Next, i is allocated zi0 units of bread and for each digital category j, i will
be allocated zij songs from this category in the order specified by Tij , after taking into consideration
the songs produced by all agents in this category. Let us give a small example: Suppose agent Tij
has song s and agent i′ as its top 2 elements, zij = 3.5 and agent i
′ has produced 4 songs in category
j. Then, i will be allocated a copy of s and copies of 2.5 of the 4 songs produced by i′. The eventual
set of goods allocated to an agent will be called her detailed allocation. We will denote i’s detailed
allocation by xi = (xi0, . . . , xig), where xi0 = zi0 and for 1 ≤ j ≤ g, xij is the set of songs allocated
2Without the assumption of divisibility, equilibrium will simply not exist, e.g., see [DGS05] which assumes, in the
context of collateral equilibrium, that houses are divisible. Typical semantically substitutable digital goods are bought
in large numbers, thereby making rounding errors insignificant and justifying the assumption of divisibility in our
model.
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to i, taking fractions into consideration. Observe that an agent may buy a song she has produced or
owns. Since the earnings from this sale go back to her, effectively she is getting such a song for free,
as is reasonable.
We now give an example to show that not every bundle of songs is valid in our model and hence one
cannot define a preference order over all bundles in our model. Suppose Sj = {s1, s2, s3} and the
total order of agent i for this category has s3, s2, s1 as its top 3 entries, in that order. Then, {s1, s2}
is not a valid bundle for i whereas {s2, s3} is.
4 The Notion of Equilibrium
First, consider the following viewpoint for the case of conventional goods. The usual assumption of
divisibility of conventional goods is not true at some minute enough level – let us call it a morsel.
Clearly, each morsel can be consumed by at most one agent. Now equilibrium demands that all
morsels that are available be consumed and no agent has unfulfilled demand for more at given prices.
Analogously, for our realm, equilibrium should satisfy the following. Each song can be sold at most
once to each agent. Furthermore, each song that is available must be sold to at least one agent and
no agent should have unfulfilled demand in any category.
We now formally define the notion of equilibrium for our model. We will make the usual assumption
that each agent works in a manner that optimizes her earnings and she spends all her earnings to
buy an optimal bundle of goods. We will say that prices p, detailed allocation x and production y
constitute an equilibrium if they satisfy the following conditions:
1. For each agent i ∈ A, yi optimizes i’s total earnings, i.e., from sales of the songs she owns and
produces and from bread she produces, w.r.t. prices p, the allocations of digital goods to all
the agents, x(−0), and the production of digital goods of all the rest of the agents, y(−i,−0).
2. For each agent i ∈ A, xi is an optimal detailed allocation at prices p for the amount of money
she has earned.
3. The market clears. For bread this means that the amount of bread demanded equals the
amount of bread produced. For each digital category j, if pj > 0, then at least one full copy
of each song in Sj and each song produced in this category is sold. By “full copy” we mean
that some agent buys the entire song; 2 agents buying half of this song is not sufficient. In
particular, if an agent produces a fraction f of a song, then some agent must buy this entire
fraction. Furthermore, for market clearing we want that for each agent i, xij must not be
greater than the total number of songs available in category j.
Observe that for the case of produced songs, optimality of agents’ production also implies that one
full copy of the song be sold – because otherwise, the agent is better off producing bread instead of
the unsold part of the song. However, this condition is also a market clearing condition, hence we
have included it there as well.
For digital categories, our equilibrium notion has a Cournot-type aspect to it. Unlike bread, for
which the earnings depend only on the amount produced (assuming prices are fixed), the earnings
from a song depend on the number of copies sold which in turn depends on the production of the
rest of the agents.
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5 Existence of Equilibrium
Let (p,x,y) be prices, detailed allocations and production of goods for the instanceM of our market.
We first give some definitions w.r.t. digital category j. With a slight abuse of notation, for an agent
i and category j, we will denote the number of songs produced by i in this category by yij and for
k ∈ Sj , we will define ykj = 1, i.e., Sj contains complete songs. Let Yj denote the total number of
songs available in this category, i.e., either initially or produced. Clearly, Yj =
∑
k∈(A∪Sj) ykj. Again,
with a slight abuse of notation, we will denote the number of songs obtained by i from category j by
xij . xij is further partitioned by adding a third coordinate k. For k ∈ Sj, xijk will denote how much
of this song is bought by i. Also, for each agent k ∈ A, xijk will denote how many songs produced
by agent k are bought by i. Observe that the two sets of k’s are disjoint. Furthermore, all xijks, for
k ∈ (Sj ∪A), specify xij . Hence, we will view x as having 3 indices, i, j and k.
Define the excess demand of agent i for category j,
dij = max{0, xij − Yj};
observe that this is the number of songs that cannot be allocated to i under the given allocation and
production, x and y. Clearly, dij ≥ 0.
For song k ∈ (A ∪ Sj), define the excess supply of this song to be
lkj = ykj −max
i∈A
{xijk}.
Because of the manner in which a detailed allocation is obtained, lkj ≥ 0.
We next introduce the notion of a market maker. We will need this notion only for the purpose of
proving existence of equilibrium; this fictitious entity is not needed in our model or our notion of
equilibrium. If for some i, dij > 0, then the market maker will produce maxi∈A{dij} extra songs in
category j and will sell them appropriately to ensure that each agent i gets xij songs. Furthermore,
if lkj > 0, then the market maker will buy lkj amount of the song produced by agent k in category j.
Now, let us define the total number of songs bought by all agents in category j,
b(j) =
∑
i∈A
xij =
∑
i∈A

dij + ∑
k∈(A∪Sj)
xijk

.
Finally, let us define the total number of songs sold from category j to be
s(j) =
∑
k∈(A∪Sj)
(
lkj +
∑
i∈A
xijk
)
.
For the case of bread, denote the number of units bought by
b(0) =
∑
i∈A
xi0
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and the number of units produced by
s(0) =
∑
i∈A
yi0.
Lemma 1 For a digital category j, if b(j) = s(j) then there is no excess demand or excess supply
w.r.t. this category, i.e., ∀i ∈ A, dij = 0 and ∀k ∈ (A ∪ Sj), lkj = 0.
Proof : From the definitions of excess demand and excess supply, we have
∃i ∈ A s.t. dij > 0 ⇒ ∀k ∈ (A ∪ Sj) : lkj = 0,
since buyer i with dij > 0 must buy all Yj sings. Furthermore,
∃k ∈ (A ∪ Sj) : lkj > 0 ⇒ ∀i ∈ A : dij = 0,
since not all songs in category j are fully sold. Thus, w.r.t. category j, we cannot have an agent
having positive excess demand and a song having positive excess supply simultaneously.
Next, equating the expressions for b(j) and s(j) given above and canceling common terms we get
∑
i∈A
dij =
∑
k∈(A∪Sj)
lkj.
By the previous fact and the fact that both sides of this equation are non-negative, they must both
be zero. The lemma follows from the non-negativity of dij ’s and lkj ’s. ✷
5.1 The correspondence and its properties
In this section we will define the correspondence, F , on which we will apply Kakutani’s fixed-point
theorem to show existence of equilibrium. We first specify the domain over which F is defined. Let
M denote an upper bound on the number of units of bread or the number of songs that would be
available if all agents simply produced only one good; the number of initial songs in the Sj ’s is also
taken into consideration in obtaining M . Next, we will modify the assumption of non-satiation as
follows: assume that each agent gets fully satiated for good j after obtaining 1.1M units of it, i.e., her
utility function “flattens out” in dimension j after 1.1M units. This does not change the equilibrium;
however, it ensures the useful property that optimal bundles are bounded, thereby enabling us to
define F over a convex, compact set. Let D be the interval [0, 1.1M ] and ∆g be the unit g-dimensional
simplex. Let s = maxgj=1{|Sj |}.
Then, the domain of F is ∆g ×D
n(g+1)(n+s) ×Dn(g+1). We will represent an element of this domain
by (p,x,y), where p ∈ ∆g, x ∈ D
n(g+1)(n+s) and y ∈ Dn(g+1).
Finally, for an element (p,x,y) in this domain, (p′,x′,y′) ∈ F (p,x,y) iff (p′,x′,y′) lies in this
domain and
• x′ is an optimal detailed allocation w.r.t. prices p and production y.
8
• y′ is a production of all agents satisfying: ∀i ∈ A, y′i is an optimal production of agent i w.r.t.
prices p, allocation x and the productions of the rest of the agents according to y−i.
• p′ = argmaxq∈∆g

q0 b(0) + 1s(0) + 1 +
g∑
j=1
qj
b(j)
s(j)

 .
Observe that the denominators of each of the g + 1 terms in this sum is positive; for the first
term because of adding 1 and for the remaining terms because of the songs in Sj’s.
We will next prove a sequence of lemmas which will lead to Theorem 8. For this purpose, it will be
convenient to decompose F into three correspondences, F1, F2, F3 which will map (p,x,y) to the set
of p′s, x′s and y′s respectively, as defined above. Also, define F ′2 to be the correspondence that maps
(p,x,y) to the set of z′s, where z′ is an optimal coarse allocation at prices p, given production y.
Lemma 2 Correspondence F ′2 is upper hemi-continuous.
Proof : First observe that for each buyer i, the earning of i is a continuous function of (p,x,y).
Since i’s coarse utility function, fi, is concave and continuous, the set of z
′
is is an upper hemi-
continuous correspondence of p, y, and the earnings of i. Composing the two we get that the
correspondence F ′2 is upper hemi-continuous. ✷
Lemma 3 Correspondence F2 is upper hemi-continuous.
Proof : For conventinal goods, the detailed allocation is the same as the coarse allocation. For a
digital category, the coarse allocation is a number; this, together with the total order, yields a vector
of dimension n+ s, i.e., the detailed allocation. Clearly, this map is continuous. Hence, the detailed
allocation is a continuous function of the coarse allocation. This fact together with Lemma 2 yields
the current lemma. ✷
Lemma 4 Correspondence F3 is upper hemi-continuous.
Proof : This follows from the assumption that for each agent, the set of feasible production points
is a compact, convex set. ✷
Lemma 5 The set of songs produced by the market maker and the set of songs bought by the market
maker are continuous functions of the coarse demand and the production of all agents.
Proof : The lemma follows from the following two observations:
• For each agent i and category j, the excess demand of i for j is a continuous function of the
coarse demand and the production of all agents.
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• For each song k and category j, the excess supply of k is a continuous function of the coarse
demand and the production of all agents.
✷
Given functions b, s : {0, 1, . . . g} → R+ define correspondence F
′
1 to be the set of all p
′ satisfying:
p
′ = argmaxq∈∆g

q0 b(0) + 1s(0) + 1 +
g∑
j=1
qj
b(j)
s(j)

 .
Note that b and s are meant to be the functions defined above, which represent the total number of
songs (amount of bread) bought and sold, respectively.
Lemma 6 Correspondence F ′1 is upper hemi-continuous.
Proof : Observe that p′s are the optimal solutions to an LP whose objective function is obtained
from b and s but whose constraints are fixed, i.e., p′ ∈ ∆g. Upper hemi-continuity follows from the
fact that the feasible region of this LP is a compact set. ✷
Lemma 7 Correspondence F1 is upper hemi-continuous.
Proof : First consider the function b representing the total number of songs (amount of bread)
bought, given allocations x and production y. It is easy to see that Lemma 5 implies that the set of
all such bs is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence. A similar statement holds for the set of all
functions s.
Now, Lemma 6 and the fact that the composition of upper hemi-continuous correspondences is an
upper hemi-continuous correspondence proves the current lemma. ✷
Theorem 8 Correspondence F is upper hemi-continuous and has nonempty, compact and convex
values.
Proof : Non-emptiness is obvious and upper hemi-continuity of F follows from Lemmas 3, 4 and
7.
We will prove that the correspondences F1, F2 and F3 have convex values, hence proving it for F . F1
is convex-valued because the set of prices are solutions to an LP, as shown in Lemma 6. Next, observe
that correspondence F ′2 has convex values, since coarse allocations maximize a concave function, i.e.,
the utility function, subject to budget constraints. It is easy to see that the mapping from coarse
allocations to detailed allocations preserves this convexity and hence F2 is convex-valued. Finally,
optimal production is maximizing a linear function, i.e., the earnings of each agent, subject to being
in the convex set of feasible production points. Hence, the set of optimal productions also form a
convex set and hence F3 is convex-valued.
Finally, compactness of the values of F follows from its upper hemi-continuity. ✷
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5.2 The fixed points of F are equilibria
We show below that the set of fixed points of F captures exactly the set of equilibria of market M.
Theorem 9 (p∗,x∗,y∗) ∈ F (p∗,x∗,y∗) iff (p∗,x∗,y∗) is an equilibrium of market M.
Proof : (⇒) The definition of correspondence F implies the first 2 conditions of equilibrium,
i.e., allocation and production are optimal. Hence we only need to establish the market clearing
condition.
Let
α = max
{
b(0) + 1
s(0) + 1
,
b(1)
s(1)
,
b(2)
s(2)
, . . . ,
b(g)
s(g)
}
.
From the manner in which p′ is obtained in the definition of correspondence F , it follows that if
p∗0 > 0 then (b(0) + 1)/(s(0) + 1) = α and for 1 ≤ j ≤ g, if p
∗
j > 0 then (b(j)/s(j)) = α.
If p∗0 > 0, we get p
∗
0b(0) = αp
∗
0s(0) + (α − 1)p
∗
0. Observe that p
∗
0b(0) is the total money spent on
bread and p∗0s(0) is the total money earned from bread.
For 1 ≤ j ≤ g, if p∗j > 0 then p
∗
0b(j) = αp
∗
0s(j). With the involvement of the market maker, the
l.h.s. of this equation is the total money spent on digital category j and the r.h.s. is α times the
total money earned from this category. Adding up all these equations, the l.h.s. will be the total
amount of money spent by all agents under prices, allocation and production given by (p∗,x∗,y∗).
The r.h.s. will be α times the total money earned by all agents; in addition, if p∗0 > 0, the r.h.s. will
have the additional term (α− 1)p∗0.
Now, if α > 1, the total money spent will exceed the total money earned. However, by definition, an
agent cannot spend more than she earns, leading to a contradiction. If α < 1, the total money spent
will be strictly smaller than the total money earned. If so, there is an agent who is not spending all
the money she earns. Because of the assumption of non-satiation, which applies while her allocation
lies within Dg+1, she is not getting an optimal allocation, leading to a contradiction. Hence we get
that α = 1.
Consider a good j with j 6= 0 and p∗j = 0. Now b(j)/s(j) cannot exceed the maximum value, i.e. α,
hence b(j) ≤ αs(j). Since α = 1, b(j) ≤ s(j). However, observe that by non-satiation, each buyer
will desire 1.1M units of j. On the other hand, since at most M units of j are available for sale,
b(j) > s(j), leading to a contradiction. If p∗0 = 0, we must have b(0) + 1 ≤ s(0) + 1, leading to the
same contradiction. Therefore, for all goods j, p∗j > 0. Hence, for all goods j, b(j) = s(j).
For the case of bread, this directly implies market clearing. For a digital category, we get from
Lemma 1 that there is no excess demand or excess supply w.r.t. this category. Therefore, even
without the intervention of the market maker, the market clears for this good.
(⇐) Assume that (p∗,x∗,y∗) is an equilibrium of market M. Because of the market clearing
condition, there is no excess demand or supply of any good and therefore for each j, d(j) = s(j).
Hence any p′ ∈ ∆g maximizes the expression in the definition of F , as does p
∗. This together with
optimality of allocations and production guaranteed by equilibrium give (p∗,x∗,y∗) ∈ F (p∗,x∗,y∗).
✷
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6 Welfare Theorems for the Conventional Part of the Mixed Econ-
omy
In the Introduction, we have provided basic reasons due to which the Welfare Theorems are not
applicable as such to digital goods. Below we salvage both Welfare Theorems to the extent possible
– we show that the allocations of conventional goods are not rendered inefficient or “socially unfair”
in the mixed economy.
Consider an equilibrium for a marketM in our model and let u1, . . . un be the utilities accrued by the
agents, as given by their coarse utility functions. Fix the production and allocation of digital goods
as per this equilibrium and consider all possible ways of changing the production of conventional
goods (as long as each agent is operating as a feasible production point) and allocation of available
conventional goods among agents. If the utilities accrued in this manner never Pareto dominate
u1, . . . un then we will say that utilities u1, . . . un are partially Pareto optimal.
Theorem 10 (First Welfare Theorem) The utilities accrued in any equilibrium of our model are
partially Pareto optimal.
Proof : Let equilibrium utilities be u1, . . . un and suppose they are not partially Pareto optimal.
Then there exist utilities v1, . . . vn which are attained by changing the production and allocation of
conventional goods such that w.l.o.g., vi ≥ ui for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 and vn > un. We will call this the
second production and the second allocation. Let p denote equilibrium prices of goods and let mi
be the money spent by agent i for buying the bundle at prices p that gives her utility ui.
Consider agent i, for 1 ≤ i < n. Since her equilibrium allocation is a utility maximizing bundle of
goods, the cost, at prices p, of her second allocation must be ≥ mi (since the utility she accrues from
it is vi ≥ ui). By the same argument, the cost of the second allocation to agent n, which gives her
utility vn > un, must be > mi. Hence, the total cost, at prices p, of all goods allocated in the second
allocation is >
∑
imi. Hence, the total value of conventional goods produced by the agents in the
second production is more than that in equilibrium, which contradicts optimality of production of
the agents w.r.t. prices p. Hence utilities u1, . . . un are partially Pareto optimal. ✷
Let us say that the economy represented by market M consisting of digital and conventional goods
is a mixed economy. By restriction of M to conventional economy we mean that each agent will be
involved in the production of conventional goods only, via a feasible point in her production set, and
the set of all conventional goods available as a result will be allocated to the agents in some manner.
Any way of redistributing the total earnings of all agents in a mixed economy will be called a wealth
transfer function, and will be denoted by w. Thus, for each agent i, wi ≥ 0, and
∑
i∈Awi is the
total earnings of all agents. An equilibrium with wealth transfer function w differs from the notion
of equilibrium given in Section 4 only in that each agent now spends money wi to obtain an optimal
detailed allocation; clearly,
∑
i∈Awi must be the total earnings of all agents.
Theorem 11 (Second Welfare Theorem) If u1, . . . , un are utilities attained by agents, via fea-
sible production and allocation, in a restriction of M to a conventional economy, then there exists a
wealth transfer function w and a parameter α ≥ 1 such that an equilibrium with transfer function w
allocates the utility of vi = α · ui to each agent i.
12
Proof : We will prove the existence of such an equilibrium and wealth transfer function using
Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. For this purpose, we will define a correspondence H that is related
to correspondence F defined in Section 5.1; terms that are not defined in this proof will have the
same definition as in Section 5.
Using parameter M defined in that section, and assuming that the sum of prices of all conventional
goods and digital categories is unit, one can place an upper bound on the total earnings of all agents,
say e. Let E be the interval [0, e]. Now, the domain of H is ∆g×D
n(g+1)(n+s)×Dn(g+1)×En. We will
represent an element of this domain by (p,x,y,w), where p ∈ ∆g, x ∈ D
n(g+1)(n+s), y ∈ Dn(g+1),
and w ∈ En.
For an element (p,x,y,w) in this domain, (p′,x′,y′,w′) ∈ H(p,x,y,w) iff (p′,x′,y′,w′) lies in this
domain and
• x′ is an optimal detailed allocation w.r.t. prices p, production y, and wealth transfer function
w.
• y′ is a production of all agents satisfying: ∀i ∈ A, y′i is an optimal production of agent i w.r.t.
prices p, allocation x, and the productions of the rest of the agents according to y−i.
• p′ = argmaxq∈∆g

q0 b(0) + 1s(0) + 1 +
g∑
j=1
qj
b(j)
s(j)

 .
Observe that the denominators of each of the g + 1 terms in this sum is positive; for the first
term because of adding 1 and for the remaining terms because of the songs in Sj’s.
• Let the total earnings of all agents under prices p, allocation x, and production y be γ. Let
∆γ be γ scaling of the unit n − 1-dimensional simplex, i.e., the n coordinates of each point
should sum up to γ. Then,
w
′ = arg min
r∈∆γ
{∑
i∈A
fi(x
′
i) · ri
ui
}
,
where with a slight abuse of notation, the argument of fi is a detailed allocation rather than
a coarse allocation; the intended meaning of fi(x
′
i) is the utility derived by i from the coarse
allocation corresponding to xi.
It is easy to see that correspondence H satisfies the properties given in Theorem 8 that were satisfied
by F and hence by Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, it has a fixed point, say (p∗,x∗,y∗,w∗). By a
proof similar to that of Theorem 9, this must be an equilibrium with wealth transfer function w∗.
For i ∈ A, let vi = fi(x
∗
i ), i.e., the utility derived by i in this equilibrium. Because of the way
w
′ is defined in correspondence H, it is easy to see that there is a parameter α > 0 such that
for each i ∈ A, vi = α · ui. Let ni be the total earnings of agent i in this equilibrium. Clearly,∑
i∈A ni =
∑
i∈A w
∗
i .
Finally, we prove that α ≥ 1. Consider the production and allocation in the restriction of M
to a conventional economy that gave rise to utilities u1, . . . , un. Assuming that the prices of the
conventional goods are as in p∗, let mi be the earnings of agent i and let si be cost of the allocation
given to i, i.e., the money spent by i. Clearly,
∑
i∈Ami =
∑
i∈A si.
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The crucial observation is that the production that was chosen by agent i in the restricted economy
is available to agent i in the mixed economy as well and we have assumed the same prices in both
economies. Hence, her earnings need to be at least as large, i.e, ni ≥ mi. Combining with the two
equations established above, we get
∑
i∈Aw
∗
i ≥
∑
i∈A si. Hence, there is an agent, say i, such that
w∗i ≥ si, i.e, i spends at least as much in the mixed economy as in the restricted economy. Since the
prices of conventional goods are the same in both and in the mixed economy, i is obtaining a bundle
that maximizes her coarse utility function, vi ≥ ui. Hence α ≥ 1. ✷
7 Salient Features of our Model
We have made some major simplifying assumptions in the preceeding sections in order to keep the
formulations and proofs easy to follow. Two of these assumptions are easy to relax conceptually and
we do so here. First, we will assume a complete conventional economy in our model rather than
just one good, i.e, bread. In particular, this change is required when talking about a Pareto optimal
allocation, since in the presence of only one good, any allocation is Pareto optimal. Second, we do
not have to assume that agent i likes all songs produced by agent i′ in category j equally. Let Si′j
represent the set of all possible songs that agent i′ could potentially produce in category j. Now, for
each category j, each agent i will pick a total order Tij over
Sj ∪

 ⋃
i′∈A
Si′j

 .
Thus, Tij gives the ratings of i over all songs in category j which either exist or can potentially be
produced. It is easy to see that nothing changes conceptually in the proof of existence of equilibrium.
Observe that each agent is required to pick a total order over the set stated above – this requirement
is akin to a non-satiation assumption in the Arrow-Debreu model.
Due to fundamental differences between conventional and digital goods, differences between the
Arrow-Debreu model and ours were unavoidable. However, one can see that these are differences
only in a very literal sense – in spirit, we have tried to remain as close to the Arrow-Debreu model
as was possible. The notion of an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is very much a best response of each
agent to the actions of all other agents – the assumption of a large economy, in which individual
actions do not change prices of goods, makes the notion seem less stringent than a Nash equilibrium.
It is because of this assumption that the only signal needed by a producer to determine his optimal
production is the prices of goods.
In our economy also, we assume that individual actions do not change prices of digital categories.
Although price is not unique to individual songs, demand is, and demand crucially determines the
earnings of a producer. Hence, for such goods, the signal needed by a producer is not only the prices
of digital categories but also the potential sales of a song if he were to produce it in the various
categories. This gives our notion of equilibrium a Cournot-type or Nash equilibrium-type flavor.
These differences naturally make our exact mathematical formulation quite different from that of
Arrow-Debreu. In turn, the difference manifests itself in the proof of existence of equilibrium – the
notion of a market maker in our proof helps simplify it considerably.
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In our definition of market clearing, we have required that one entire copy of each song (or fraction)
that is produced must be sold to some agent. We note that “one” cannot be replaced by any other
integer. For instance, if we replace “one” by “two”, then in order to sell the second copy, we may
need to drop the price of some category to a low value. However, at this price, some agent may
demand more songs than there are in this category, contradicting market clearing for a different
reason.
In choosing an optimal production and an optimal consumption, we are assuming that agents are
simply optimizing at both steps. In particular, they are not allowed to resort to strategic behavior,
i.e., pick a suboptimal production that eventually leads to an even better bundle of goods.
Recall that an agent is allowed to buy a copy of her own song. In this process, what she earns from
herself (in her optimal production), she spends to buy her own song in her optimal bundle. Note
however, that no inconsistencies are created in the process – the agent is still required to choose
an optimal production followed by an optimal consumption, and hence clearing of her song is not
automatic.
The issue of divisibility of goods is a stumbling block in the conventional economy as well. Whereas
this assumption holds for consumer goods, for a very large fraction of the economy, consisting of
automobiles, houses, electronic goods, etc., this assumption does not hold. On the other hand,
without the assumption of divisibility, fixed point theorems will not be applicable, ruling out existence
of equilibrium. Divisibility of songs is a less contentious assumption than divisibility of cars – one
can enjoy half a song but not half a car.
Observe that our model does not postulate the existence of an entity, such as iTunes, for selling
songs. It is simply postulating uniform prices for all songs in a particular category. Under this
assumption, the market as a whole will decide the customary price for each category, by taking into
account supply and demand, and producers will price their songs accordingly – if they don’t, their
songs will presumably be ignored by customers who have little time for dealing with complex pricing
structures.
The central question that arises is: Won’t the more talented producer of songs want to sell her songs
at a premium? Besides the issue of simplicity of prices, there are also economic reasons why she may
not: First, the negligible cost of making copies in the digital realm ensures that a higher volume
of sales leads to substantially higher earnings than happens for conventional goods. Indeed, the
standard assumption in the latter setting is decreasing marginal production (which makes marginal
cost the natural price for such goods). Second, a consideration that is much more important in the
digital realm than in the conventional marketplace is capturing market share. The reason again is
the limitless supply of a song, once it is produced, and the desire to capitalize on this.
If despite this, a song producer deviates from standard prices, she may have to justify this, since
there would be a plethora of songs that are priced “right”. Currently, in the marketplace, such price
differentiation and its justification typically follows technical considerations, such as standard vs high
definition recording, standard vs 3D movie, old vs newly released movie, etc.
In our model, and in reality, once a buyer decides how many songs she desires, she simply chooses
the best ones per her taste. This automatically ensures that the most talented song producers are
rewarded with higher sales and hence higher earnings.
Although our model does not allow pricing each digital good individually, since that would be
prohibitively cumbersome for customers, it does allow the possibility of splitting a category into
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a few categories by quality, e.g., premium songs and regular songs, and pricing them differently. A
song producer is free to put her song in either category. However, if she over-rates her song and
places it in the premium category, she runs the risk of being at the bottom of all agents’ lists and
thereby earning even less than she would if she had priced her song “correctly”.
Next we mention the mathematical reason for assuming a non-empty starting set of songs in each
category. Without such a set, the market clearing condition applies to produced songs only, but this
is trivially satisfied as follows: set the price of this category so high that no one wants a song from it
and hence no one produces it. Our assumption ensures that such meaningless “equilibria” are ruled
out. Once again, this aspect arises because of the peculiarities of the digital setting.
A potential pitfall with the assumption mentioned above is that if Sj contains a song that no one
desires and everyone puts at the bottom of their lists, then the only way to clear this song may
be to set the price of this category to almost zero. The following reasonable assumption provides
a recourse: the songs in Sj are special – not only do they define the category, but they are also
among the better rated songs in this category, e.g., the set of songs defining classical music should
not contain one that is simply noise.
Consider the very special instance in which for a certain category, all agents have the same total
order. In this case, equilibrium entails giving at least one agent all songs in this category and hence
the equilibrium price of this category may turn out to be very low. Can this eventuality be held
against our market model? Our answer is “no” – even in the traditional model, if the instance is
ill-formed, the price of some goods may have to be made very low, or even zero, to clear it. For
example, assume that agents have Leontief utilities for bread and butter and they all desire equal
amounts of both these items. Now if the market has equal amounts of both items, both can be priced
positively. However, even if the difference in amounts is minuscule, the more abundant good will be
priced at zero.
8 Discussion
As pointed out in Section 7, we have made a very deliberate attempt at keeping our model simple in
order to highlight its main new features. Exploring more complex market models with digital goods
seems worthwhile. In particular, one could add complementarity in production, e.g., the production
of a piece of classical music or a movie requires people of many different talents to come together, and
one could add complementarity in consumption, e.g., if someone buys a certain movie, they would
also like to buys songs sung in that movie.
Clearly, a major open question remaining is understanding the pricing of digital goods that do not
lie in our class. An exceedingly important consideration in digital marketplaces today is “capturing
market share” or “capturing attention”. Providing a better understanding of this aspect via formal
models would be very worthwhile, e.g., shedding more light on the economics of providing some
digital good for free, such as web search results, in return for attention, which in turn results in sales
of other goods, including conventional ones.
An important question remaining is the design of efficient algorithms for computing equilibria for
our model and experimentally verifying its merits and its predictive value, e.g., predicting the price
of a newly introduced category. For conventional goods, Fisher-based models have been found to
have better algorithmic properties than Arrow-Debreu-based models, and it may be easier to seek
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algorithms for the Fisher-based version of our model as well. The digital part of such a model would
have buyers with money who desire goods, a labor force that produces these goods and categories of
digital goods.
Looking beyond these immediate questions, one may attempt to include in the model mechanisms for
creation of new categories and extinction of old categories. In a different direction, it is worthwhile
exploring other models that move away from game-theoretic assumptions of full rationality and
infinite computing power.
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